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Government Policy 
by Murray Weidenbaum 
There is a growing tension between the 
increasingly global nature of the modern 
high-tech economy and the traditionally na-
tional or regional orientation of government 
and business decision makers. 
How we respond to that tension will be 
the test of our own decision making. Clearly, 
technology and economics are out-pacing 
both traditional management practices and 
traditional politics. The standard geopolitical 
map and the emerging techno-economic map 
are out of sync. To put it another way, the 
global village envisioned by Marshall 
McLuhan may not be here yet, but the global 
marketplace surely is. 
The Global Enterprise 
Already, about one-half of all U.S. imports 
and exports are transactions between U.S. 
firms and their foreign affiliates or parents. 
What, from the viewpoint of public policy, 
are international economic transactions or 
foreign trade, then, often turn out to be 
merely internal transfers within an individual 
business firm. Also, about one-half of all 
U.S.-made products contain some foreign 
components. We truly have entered the age 
of the global enterprise. 
Murray Weidenbaum is Director of the Center for 
the Study of American Business and Mallinckrodt 
Distinguished University Professor at Washington 
University in St. Louis. The author benefited from 
numerous discussions on this topic with John 
Y ochelson of the Center for Strategic and Interna-
tional Studies. 
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Here are some examples. Unisys is an 
amalgam of Burroughs and Sperry Rand, 
with annual sales in the neighborhood of $10 
billion. Half of that is overseas, in over a 
hundred different industrialized and devel-
oping countries. The company uses compo-
nents produced in four continents. Its fi-
nancing is literally worldwide. Unisys re-
cently had to raise $5 billion overnight, and 
did so through a consortium of 50 interna-
tional banks in various countries around the 
world. 
On another occasion, Unisys shifted a 
complex production operation from Califor-
nia to Singapore in less than 90 days, suppos-
edly without missing a beat. It delivers any-
where in the world within 36 hours. All 100 
percent of its products are shipped by jet air-
planes. The communications needs of such 
an organization are uniquely modern and 
truly global. 
Another way of looking at Unisys is to see 
that the very notion of property rights and 
corporate function is undergoing a funda-
mental change. This American company is 
simultaneously a customer of -- and a sup-
plier to -- IBM and Honeywell in the United 
States, BASF, Phillips, and Siemens in the 
European Economic Community, and Fujitsu 
and Hitachi in Japan. These companies to-
gether engage in joint ventures, co-produce, 
serve as sources for each other, share output, 
and compete. 
But Unisys is not unique. Let us take an-
other example -- Corning Glass. Over half of 
its profits come from joint ventures, two-
thirds of which are with a wide range of for-
eign companies, including Siemens in West 
Germany, Ciba Geigy in Switzerland, Sam-
sung in South Korea, and Asahi Glass in 
Japan. 
It is often said that "politics makes strange 
bedfellows," but this is true of global eco-
nomics as well. In 1986, Texas Instruments 
sued Hitachi for patent infringement. Today, 
the two companies are teamed up to develop 
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the next generation of memory chips. Joint 
ventures between U.S. and Japanese firms 
are now commonplace in the computer chip 
area. Motorola shares output with Fujitsu, 
Toshiba, and Mitsubishi. Intel has technical 
exchanges with Fujitsu. National Semicon-
ductor shares manufacturing with Mitsubishi. 
It is intriguing to note that America's IBM 
is the role model for so many of the overseas 
activities of Japanese firms. Japanese ec-
onomists believe that the key to IBM's global 
strength is the location of its basic research 
laboratories in Switzerland, Japan, and the 
United States, with 30-odd research divisions 
around the world. 
Government policy seems stuck in the 
same old territorial mold, focusing 
narrowly on the geographical area of 
each unit's jurisdiction. 
As a final example, consider Ford and 
Volkswagen. Although tough competitors in 
our domestic market, they merged their 
South American operations in Brazil and Ar-
gentina a few years ago to form Autolatino. 
This trend is globalization from the view-
point of the firm. But every enterprise, even 
the local supermarket, also has to deal with 
government and public policy. The political 
debates often seem to be taking place in a 
different, perhaps earlier world. Govern-
ment policy seems stuck in the same old ter-
ritorial mold, focusing narrowly on the geo-
graphical area of each unit's jurisdiction. 
Key Points of Tension in Public Policy 
Ironically, while the global marketplace is 
expanding and farsighted business executives 
prepare for the 21st century, we are seeing a 
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resurgence of 19th century-style protectionist 
sentiment in the United States. This tradi-
tional public policy approach responds to the 
global economy with more controls over im-
ports and exports. Nor is this attitude limited 
to the public sector. Many business and labor 
leaders are pushing hard to limit imports into 
the United States. 
The new buzzword in Washington is re-
ciprocity. Reciprocity is a strange beast. It is 
concerned with achieving positive trade bal-
ances with individual countries. But re-
ciprocity as currently practiced focuses on 
imports into the United States, ignoring the 
export side of the international trade ledger. 
But there is a second set of trade controls 
-- those on exports. These "national security" 
controls are necessarily oblivious to the ques-
tion of trade balances. Nonetheless, any re-
striction on exports increases our trade 
deficit. 
Thus the federal government has two con-
flicting sets of policies: (1) to restrain im-
ports, because of the concern about the 
triple-digit (in billions) deficit in the U.S. 
balance of payments, but (2) simultaneously 
to restrain U.S. exports, which are the great 
hope of reducing that same deficit. To say 
that the left hand and the right hand are not 
terribly well coordinated understates the 
case. 
Technology Transfers 
A major current concern is the battle over 
technology transfer. With respect to Japan 
and aerospace technology, the Department of 
Commerce, on the one hand, and the De-
partments of Defense and State on the other 
are engaged in a tug-of-war over the 
Japanese building an advanced fighter air-
craft, the FSX. 
This is nothing new, although the sides 
have changed. In 1982, it was State vs. De-
fense, with Commerce pretty much in the 
background. That battle was over the natural 
gas pipeline between the Soviet Union and 
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Western Europe, and then concerns focused 
on extraterritoriality -- extending U.S. policy 
to the overseas operations of companies 
headquartered in the United States. 
IBM is an important role model for over-
coming national barriers to technology trans-
fers. The company has basic research labora-
tories in Japan, Switzerland, and the United 
States. IBM has over 30 research divisions a-
round the world. Thus, its international tech-
nology transfer is often internal to the firm. 
Stanley Works of Connecticut presents a 
more modest and interesting variation. En-
gineers at its tool factories in France, Eng-
land and Taiwan are developing automation 
techniques that are used on assembly lines 
here at home. It is useful, in this regard, to 
recognize the potential for technology trans-
fers into the United States. 
Overcoming Territorial Barriers 
to Air Travel 
In this world of modern transportation 
and communication, it is interesting to look 
at the conflicts over international air rights. 
If there is anything inextricably linked to the 
global economy, it is modern transportation. 
Yet policy in this area is extremely territorial. 
The national airlines -- those that carry the 
country's flag-- are the primary focus of avia-
tion policy in most countries. Very little at-
tention is paid to the needs of the con-
sumers -- i.e., the passengers. Here, too, the 
competitive pressures of the global market-
place often force national carriers to take 
broader approaches than the governments 
that charter them. Thus, Trans World Air-
lines has joint marketing agreements and co-
operates on routes and schedules with eight 
foreign carriers, ranging from Air India to 
Air New Zealand to Air Canada. 
TWA's agreement with Gulf Air, a Middle 
Eastern carrier, is especially intriguing. A 
Gulf Air crew daily flies one of its planes to 
London, where it turns it over to TWA. A 
TWA crew flies the plane to New York City 
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and returns it to Gulf Air in London the next 
day. The result is that both carriers, as a 
practical matter, offer direct travel between 
the United States and the Middle East. 
United Airlines has an agreement with 
British Airways whereby the two carriers 
share space at several airports and coordi-
nate the scheduling of some flights. United 
offers its passengers seats on its partner's 
flights back to Europe, while the British air-
line provides its passengers with ready con-
nections to the western part of the United 
States. 
Other Territorial Restrictions 
There are many other examples of how 
the tension between territorially-oriented 
governments and the global marketplace is 
resolved in practice. Taxation of foreign in-
come is an old one. How to avoid double 
taxation has been the subject of many tax 
treaties. When Mobil pulled out of South 
Africa this spring, the decisive factor was a 
discouraging change in the taxation in the 
United States of its South African income. 
Another case in point is the series of at-
tempts to impose U.S. environmental reg-
ulation on other nations by means of the 
World Bank and other foreign aid activities. 
Finally, one other cloud on the horizon is 
the issue of controls over foreign direct in-
vestment. The 1988 trade act provided a 
statutory basis for interagency review of pro-
posed foreign purchases of American busi-
nesses. The primary review criterion is na-
tional security. In addition, there is a strong 
drive in the Congress to enact legislation to 
require registration of foreign ownership. 
So far, the Reagan and Bush administra-
tions have been able to hold off these and 
other proposals to respond negatively to the 
global economy. If the trade deficit stays in 
the high triple-digit range, and if the United 
States finally experiences that long-post-
poned recession, however, these protectionist 
pressures may be exacerbated. In that event, 
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we would see even greater efforts toward re-
stricting direct investment. Success in en-
acting such legislation could well generate re-
taliation by other nations. 
Success in enacting legislation to 
require registration of ownership could 
well generate retaliation. 
Somehow this is all remm1scent of the 
plaintive plea of that mythical business execu-
tive who cried, "Stop the world, I want to get 
off." 
The Rise of International Regulation 
In recent years, business/government re-
lations have been further complicated by an-
other level of response to the rise of the 
global economy. In addition to federal, state, 
county and local regulation, there now is in-
ternational regulation. I do not mean regula-
tion by foreign countries, but regulation by 
international agencies. In many ways, this is 
the natural response of politicians to the 
global economy. But, to put it mildly, not all 
of these regulatory activities are constructive. 
Some types of cooperative regulation are 
traditional, going back to the 19th century. 
For example, the forerunner of the Interna-
tional Telecommunications Union was estab-
lished back in 1865 as the International Tele-
graph Union. In those days, it dealt mainly 
with technical standards. 
The European Community (EC) and the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) are the principal reg-
ulatory organizations of the major western 
nations. They have combined technical reg-
ulation with a great variety of rules and leg-
islation designed to protect business -- their 
own. 
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There is an important distinction in this 
case between companies established within 
the jurisdiction of the European Community 
and foreign companies, that is, companies 
exporting from the United States. When 
pressed, the representatives of EC assure us 
that their restrictive regulations are aimed 
not at the United States but at Japan. Unfor-
tunately, we do not know how good their aim 
is. The same sort of regulation that hits 
Japan could also damage trade with the 
United States. Moreover, if the dynamic 
Asian rim nations find themselves restricted 
in selling to Western Europe, they are likely 
to turn to the major alternative market, the 
United States, with even greater intensity. 
There is also a new and different brand of 
regulation being developed by the United 
Nations and its specialized agencies. It has 
very little to do with protectionism or eco-
nomic efficiency. These activities are in ef-
fect political efforts by the poorer countries, 
usually in the southern half of the globe, to 
increase their share of the world's income 
and wealth. This type of regulation is in a 
development phase. Yesterday's "advisory 
resolution" becomes today's "voluntary guide-
line" and tomorrow's legally binding treaty. 
Such international agency regulation now 
covers many types of business activity. In the 
area of marketing, for instance, there is the 
World Health Organization's Infant Formula 
Code. This was supposed to be "voluntary," 
but ask Nestle how voluntary their compli-
ance was. The chemical and pharmaceutical 
industries are also long-term targets of the 
World Health Organization. 
The U.N.'s Economic and Social Council 
is developing a code governing multinational 
corporations. If enacted, its scope would be 
extremely broad, covering almost any com-
pany that tries to sell its products to people in 
another country. However, the language is 
very vague. According to the current draft of 
the code, multinational corporations should 
"avoid practices, products, or services which 
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cause detrimental effects on cultural patterns 
and socio-cultural objectives as determined 
by government." Not coincidentally, it sounds 
as if it had been written by a committee of in-
ternational bureaucrats. 
Fortunately, many members of what is 
called the Group of 77, the major developing 
nations of the United Nations, may not want 
to complete action on these matters quickly. 
Human nature being what it is, it is only nat-
ural for a representative of a very poor na-
tion such as Upper Volta or Bangladesh to be 
reluctant to leave meetings in such desirable 
locations as Paris, Rome, New York, London, 
and Geneva. Even representatives of the 
most advanced nations have been known to 
make a career out of such negotiations. 
1992: The European Community 
Let us turn to a development that is much 
closer on the horizon: the European Com-
munity's efforts to achieve economic integra-
tion by the end of 1992. There are both pros 
and cons to this development from the point 
of view of the United States. 
The most important positive aspect is that 
the EC is reducing restrictions on business 
generally, not just on foreign trade. That is 
bound to make European-based companies 
more competitive. There will be plant clos-
ings as well as openings and expansions. 
Some economists expect that the completion 
of the economic integration of the European 
Community will ultimately increase the re-
gion's GNP by 5 percent or more. Very little 
of that rise will result from removing the rela-
tively few remaining trade barriers within the 
common market. Most of the increased eco-
nomic growth is expected to come from three 
other sources: removing regulatory barriers 
to production, achieving greater economies 
of scale, and intensified competition within 
the European Community. 
There is also a big drawback -- the wall 
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around the EC is not coming down. If any-
thing, it will become more visible as the walls 
within the EC are removed. The odds are 
that U.S. firms established in the European 
Community will do well, especially those that 
are efficient, high-tech, and well-capitalized. 
High-cost European firms that have been 
sheltered from international competition will 
suffer in the process. But U.S. exports to the 
EC will rise more slowly than they would 
have in the absence of an integrated Euro-
pean Community. 
The odds are that U.S. finns already 
established in the European 
Community will do well after 1992, but 
U.S. exports to the EC will 
rise more slowly. 
Economic integration is not political inte-
gration. Although much decision-making 
power is shifting to Brussels (the headquar-
ters city of the EC), each of the twelve mem-
ber nations will retain its sovereignty. Each 
is likely to keep its own currency past 1992, 
even though the European currency unit 
(ECU) will play a greater role in interna-
tional financial transactions. Each country 
will retain its own value-added tax and other 
revenue systems, although some harmoniza-
tion may be achieved. Most fundamentally, 
twelve independent countries, albeit working 
in harmony much of the time, will still gener-
ate their individual values, needs, and cul-
ture. 
For the United States, then, the benefits 
of 1992 are a bit problematic. Beyond that, 
in the 1990s eastern Europe and western Eu-
rope are likely to be moving closer together. 
There are early signs of that already. The 
Hungarians' taking down the fence between 
Austria and Hungary was not just a symbolic 
act. There has been an increase in economic 
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relations between key eastern and western 
countries which bodes well for the future. 
The Austro-Hungarian empire was a political 
bust, but economically it made sense. The 
Austrians and the Hungarians are beginning 
to get together again in an economic way. 
East Germany and West Germany already 
have a very substantial trade flow. East 
Germany acts in good measure as an infor-
mal member of the European community be-
cause of its trade access via West Germany. 
Why make a point of all this? If the inte-
grated European Community, with separate 
political systems but by and large a unitary 
economic structure, does come off in 1992 --
and the odds are quite good that it will --
then during the 1990s Europe will become 
the world's largest market. Japan as well as 
the United States will be on the outside. If 
European trade restrictions are aimed mainly 
at Japan, that nation can be expected to focus 
its market efforts primarily on the western 
hemisphere. The United States has to decide 
who are its friends and who are its foes. 
Americans treat the Soviet Union's Gor-
bachev much more nicely than we do 
Japanese leaders. 
Conclusion 
Notwithstanding the rising tensions be-
tween domestic and international forces, in-
dividual private enterprise is becoming in-
creasingly global in scope in its purchasing, 
financing, production, and marketing. Gov-
ernment policy is changing, both here and 
overseas, but it is playing "catch up" ball. 
There is, however, a third force. The role of 
the citizen/voter/consumer is still ambiva-
lent. 
When they go to the polls, or when they 
write to their congressmen or senators, voters 
care about jobs in their locale, their state, 
and their country. Politicians react to that 
pressure. Many companies take advantage of 
it as well. After all, every company wants 
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competition -- for the other fellow, and espe-
cially among its suppliers. 
The upbeat aspect of this is that, while 
consumers may cast their votes in this tradi-
tional, territorial way, when they spend their 
dollars, they buy products made anywhere in 
the world. They routinely travel to places 
once prohibitively distant, and communicate 
in an instant with people all around the 
globe. 
Without thinking about it too deeply, most 
consumers are already adapting to a truly 
global economy. It does not take much to 
forecast that, over the years ahead, eco-
nomics and technology will increasingly force 
voters, government officials and business ex-
ecutives to further adjust to being part of the 
global marketplace. 
12 
